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Abstract 
We compare the determinants of the corporate debt ownership structure in a bank-oriented 
economy (Germany) and market-oriented economy (UK). The results, that are controlled for 
endogeneity, simultaneity and measurement errors, show that the firms in both countries 
adjust their debt ownership structure towards their target levels – British firms being the 
swifter. The evidence supports the predictions of the liquidation and renegotiation, and the 
flotation cost hypotheses in both countries. However, the moral hazard and adverse 
selection hypothesis receives support only in the UK. Moreover, the influence of market 
related factors on the choice of the lender is country dependent. Overall, the debt 
ownership structure of a firm is influenced by both the firm-specific factors and the financial 
traditions in which the firm operates. 
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The Determinants of Corporate Debt Ownership Structure: 
Evidence from Market-based and Bank-based Economies 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although firms raise both public and private debts the evidence on what determines the mix 
is sparse1. James (1996) shows that a mix of public and private debt allows distressed firms 
to alter their capital structure through non-court restructurings and hence the choice of mix is 
a complex phenomenon. The literature offers three possible explanations. First, the 
‘liquidation and renegotiation’ hypothesis postulates that the renegotiation of public debt is 
difficult, costly and is more likely to lead to a liquidation of distressed firms (Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri, 1994). Thus, firms with such risks are likely to avoid public debt. Second, the 
‘moral hazard and adverse selection’ hypothesis suggests that bank (monitored) loans are 
different from public debt as banks have cost advantage in lending and hold more 
information about the prospects of borrowing firms (Diamond, 1984). Fama (1985) argues 
that bank debt is like inside debt that may mitigate underinvestment problems. Therefore, 
firms with potential agency conflicts are contended to benefit from issuing private (e.g., bank) 
debt rather than public debt. Finally, the ‘flotation cost’ hypothesis states that there are 
economies of scale in issuing substantial amount of public debt and hence only the larger 
firms are likely to benefit from the cost-advantageous public debt (Blackwell and Kidwell, 
1988). This implies that the option of issuing public debt or bank debt is limited to the larger 
firms only.  
 
This paper investigates the determinants of choice between private and public debt and 
extends the literature in several ways. First, very few studies allow for the possible 
implications of country-specific factors and environment on the choice of the source of debt 
[1]. This study offers a unique comparison of the evidence from a bank-based economy 
(Germany) and a market-based economy (UK) that should have direct implications on the 
choice between the bank debt and public debt. Mayer (1994) argues that dispersed 
corporate ownership in the UK is an obstacle to have a long-term relationship between firms 
and banks causing firms to rely on stock markets for external financing. Modigliani and 
Perotti (2000) argue that strong shareholders’ protection makes equity markets greater and 
reduces the dominance of bank lending. These arguments offer further relevance to 
                                                          
1
 A related but separate strand of literature examines the firm value effect of public versus private 
debt. James (1987) reports that the announcement of issues of bank loan results in positive abnormal 
stock returns while the issue of non-bank private debt or straight debt to repay bank debt affect the 
firms' stock prices inversely. Similarly, Datta et al. (2000) find a significantly negative share price 
response to public debt announcements. 
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examining the corporate debt ownership structure in these two countries. We also control for 
the possible effects of relevant economic and financial factors of these countries. Therefore, 
this study offers an out of sample tests of the propositions developed in the US by providing 
unique comparative evidence from a bank-based economy and a market-based economy.  
 
Second, factors affecting the firms' debt composition change overtime. Firms with long-run 
debt ownership target attain it through an adjustment process. To test for this we apply an 
autoregressive-distributed lag model that allows for an examination of the determinants of 
bank debt use, measure the speed of adjustment to desired private versus public debt ratio, 
and to provide the static long-run relationship between this ratio and its possible 
determinants. To our knowledge, this is the first debt ownership study to consider all three 
issues simultaneously. 
 
Finally, it is likely that random shocks affect both dependent and explanatory variables at the 
same time. It is possible that the observed relation between debt-mix and its potential 
determinants indicate the effects of debt-mix on the latter rather than vice-versa. We control 
for this important issue of endogeneity by using a GMM procedure. This also overcomes the 
problems of simultaneity and measurement errors that are known to be common in firm-level 
data. We are not aware of any other study on debt ownership that controls for endogeneity.  
 
Our evidence records a few similarities in debt-mix structure of German and UK firms but it 
also detects some important differences. Therefore, the paper concludes that the relation 
between dependent and explanatory variables is country-dependent. This can be attributed 
to the differences in corporate governance mechanisms and institutional features of the 
countries.  
 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the variables and 
the related debt-mix hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the construction and analysis of data. 
Methodology and the model are developed in section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical 
results.  Last section concludes the paper. 
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II. THEORIES OF CORPORATE DEBT- MIX AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
The Dependent Variables 
Following Houston and James (1996), among others, we measure the debt ownership 
structure by the ratio of bank debt to total debt (hereafter bank-debt ratio). We also examine 
the determinants of maturity structure of bank loans. They are defined as (a) short-term bank 
debt (payable within one year) to total debt; (b) long-term bank debt (payable after one year) 
to total debt. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
We model the debt ownership structure as a function of factors that are expected to 
influence the debt-mix structure, such as liquidation and renegotiation, moral hazard and 
adverse selection, hypotheses and flotation (transaction) costs. We also control for several 
factors that represent the market conditions. 
 
Target debt ownership structure 
Lagged Dependent Variable 
There are some potential costs (hold-up problems, monitoring costs, occurrence of inefficient 
liquidations) and benefits (low moral hazard and adverse selection costs, flexible 
renegotiations) of bank financing. Berlin and Loeys (1988) argue that firms can obtain an 
optimal debt ownership structure by trading-off the inefficiencies of harsh bond covenants of 
public debt and the agency costs of hiring a delegated monitor for bank debt. Modelling of 
the determinants of the debt ownership structure assumes that the firms have target bank-
debt ratio. The lagged bank-debt ratio in the model serves as a benchmark in testing 
whether firms have a target debt ownership structure, and if indeed they do the degree of 
divergence (or convergence) from (to) this target level. Any such deviations could be 
attributed to the cost of adjustment versus the cost of being away from the target. If firms 
optimally determine their debt ownership structure the coefficient of lagged dependent 
variable should be (statistically) between 0 and 1. Considering the relatively lower cost of 
raising bank debt, the German firms should adjust their debt ownerships structure more 
swiftly than the British firms who are likely to face higher transaction costs in adjusting public 
debts. 
 
Liquidation and renegotiation 
As stated earlier the ‘liquidation and renegotiation’ hypothesis predicts that the renegotiation 
of public debt is costly, difficult and likely to cause the liquidation of financially distressed 
firms. Thus, companies that are exposed to such risks are likely to opt for bank debt. We use 
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a number of proxy variables to measure the potential risk of liquidation and the need for 
renegotiation.  
 
Debt Maturity: Schuhmacher (1998) shows that the choice of debt source depends on 
maturity need. Bank (public) debts are suitable for financing the short (long) term needs. 
Kanatas and Qi (2001) contend that bank debt is more suitable for financing assets with 
shorter economic lives. This is consistent with the notion of maturity matching hypothesis 
that firms match the maturity of liabilities with assets to minimise liquidation risk. Hence, we 
expect an inverse relation between debt maturity and bank-debt ratio. We measure the debt 
maturity by the ratio of long-term debt (maturing after one year) to total debt.  
 
Leverage: (Fama, 1985) argues that bank monitoring generates a public good that reduces 
the costs of public debt. As a result, higher bank debt may imply higher leverage owing to a 
complementary effect of bank debt on public debt. Similarly, Berlin and Loeys (1988) 
suggest that private debt (especially bank debt) provides more emphasis on monitoring than 
the public debt does. Thus, a positive association between the bank-debt ratio and the 
leverage of the firm is expected. On the other hand, firms with higher debt ratios may limit 
their bank borrowings to avoid liquidations (Diamond, 1993). Banks' motivation to monitor 
the borrowing firm, on behalf of junior public debtholders, may decline with the increase in 
public debt. Hooks and Opler (1993) find that bank borrowing is highest among firms 
employing relatively little debt in their capital structure. Hence, a negative relationship 
between bank debt and leverage is expected. Thus, how leverage affects the source of debt 
remains an empirical question. We measure leverage by the ratio of book value of total debt 
to book value of total assets [2].  
 
Liquidity: Bank loans are generally aimed at mitigating short-term liquidity problem of firms. 
Therefore, an inverse relation between liquidity and bank loan is expected. Given the close 
association between firms and the banks in Germany, the liquidity factor should be of less 
importance to German firms than to British companies. The current ratio (current assets to 
current liabilities) represents the liquidity level in our model. 
 
Interest Coverage Ratio: Interest coverage ratio can be a proxy of the severity of financial 
distress (James, 1996). Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) theorise that firms with lower 
financial distress probably opt for public debt against bank debt since the lower interest cost 
of public debt outweighs the benefits of flexible renegotiations in bank debt. We thus expect 
a negative relationship between interest coverage ratio (a proxy for financial distress) and 
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bank-debt ratio. The ratio of EBITD (earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation) to total 
interest expense represents this variable in our model. 
 
Moral hazard and adverse selection 
This hypothesis suggests that the banks are likely to have more information about the 
borrowing firms and cost advantage in lending. Bank loan is similar to inside debt that which 
may mitigate underinvestment problems. Therefore, the firms with potential agency conflicts 
should benefit more from issuing bank debt instead of public debt. The variables 
representing this argument are discussed below. 
 
Growth Opportunities: Owing to information asymmetry outside investors are weakly 
informed of the firms' growth options and are concerned about agency problems. Hence, 
they demand for higher premium. Yosha (1995) suggest that firms with potentially valuable 
future growth projects will not borrow from public debt markets owing to high disclosure 
costs of revealing sensitive information [3] Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) argue that less risky 
firms are likely to issue public debt that contains less detailed restrictive covenants. MacKie-
Mason (1990) argues that research and development intensive firms (i.e. firms with high 
growth potential) should avoid raising public debt. Thus, a positive association between 
growth opportunity and bank-debt ratio is anticipated. 
 
On the other hand, Hoshi et al. (1993) show that firms with value-enhancing investment 
opportunities will use low cost public debt as it will be costly for such firms to forego positive-
NPV projects because of high financing cost of bank debt. Houston and James (1996) argue 
that hold-up problems together with bank information monopolies may lead to a negative 
relationship between market-to-book ratio and the reliance on bank debt. Banks can hold up 
borrowing firms especially if the firms do not have alternative financing sources [4]. This 
implies an inverse relation between bank-debt ratio and growth opportunities of the firm. We 
measure growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio) as the ratio of (book value of total 
assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity) to (book value of total 
assets)[5]. This ratio can be viewed as a proxy for project quality perceived by the market 
(Johnson, 1997).  
 
Firm Quality: Diamond (1991) shows that high quality firms issue public debt while medium 
and low quality firms issue bank debt [6]. On the supply side, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue 
that banks ration credits if they cannot distinguish between good and bad firms. Therefore, 
firms that have favourable information but suffer from high information asymmetries should 
issue private debt. On the demand side, the hidden-information view contends that when the 
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advantage of hidden information is substantial firms seek better-informed financier (MacKie-
Mason, 1990). James (1987) argues that firms disclose the terms of private financing to the 
market in order to signal their true value. Thus, the adverse selection hypothesis expects a 
positive relation between firm quality and bank-debt ratio. We measure firm quality by 
abnormal earnings. Following Stohs and Mauer (1996) this is defined as the difference 
between earnings per share in years (t+1) and (t) divided by share price in year (t).  
 
Dividend Payout Ratio: The dividend policy of a firm is known to reveal information. Hidden-
information problem is likely to be exacerbated for non-dividend paying firms and hence 
such firms avoid public debt. Low et al. (2001) show that investors regard small firms' 
dividend decision as a function of bank monitoring. They show that the market reaction to 
dividend omissions by small firms with high levels of bank debt is much less negative than 
that to by firms with little or no bank debt. Thus, we anticipate an inverse relation between 
the payout ratio (a proxy of dividend policy) and bank-debt ratio.  
 
Earnings Volatility: Earnings are difficult to forecast. They are even more difficult to forecast 
when their volatility is high. MacKie-Mason (1990) argues that managers are likely to have 
advantageous information when earnings are volatile. When earnings are volatile issuing 
public debt will be costlier as investors will stipulate high 'lemons' premia. As suggested by 
Johnson (1997) earnings volatility is also a proxy for observable credit risk and probability of 
financial distress. Sy (1999) demonstrates that high credit risk firms issue private debt due to 
the benefits of renegotiating tighter restrictions. On the other hand, low credit risk firms will 
issue public debt due to benefits from increased flexibility. Thus, a positive relation between 
earnings volatility and the bank debt is expected. Following Miguel and Pindado (2001) we 
measure earnings volatility with the ratio of the sum of intangible assets and the difference 
between the standard deviation and expected value of EBIT (earnings before interest, taxes) 
to total assets. This measure (DISTRESS) also considers the probability of financial distress 
and asset specificity. High volatility in earnings widens the difference between standard 
deviation and expected value of EBIT, which in turn increases the expected financial distress 
costs. Therefore, firms with more volatile earnings tend to switch to private debt financing. 
 
Flotation costs 
Firm Size: The size of the firm can have several implications on the choice between public 
and private debts. The costs of issuing public debt are considerably higher for small firms. 
Coase (1937) argues that deterrent transaction and contracting costs discourage small firms 
from raising external funding forcing them to rely on their retained earnings. Hence, they are 
likely to borrow short-term bank debts in order to avoid diseconomies of scale and the costs 
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of financial distress. Large firms are generally mature, less risky and have relatively low 
growth opportunities, thus low potential agency problems. Moreover, large firms tend to have 
better reputation and public information leading them to issue cost-efficient public debt 
(Diamond, 1991). Mayer and Alexander (1990) show that larger firms in the UK raise less 
bank loan. The size effect is more important in market-based countries because of the 
higher cost of financial distress and lack of strong support from their banks. Thus, an inverse 
relation between bank-debt ratio and firm size is expected. We measure firm size in three 
ways, the natural logarithms of:  i) total sales, ii) total assets, and iii) total assets minus book 
value of equity plus market value of equity. However, the last definition is considered the 
main measure of size in our model. 
 
The control factors 
Stock Return Volatility: It is likely that under uncertain market conditions firms may face 
difficulties in raising public debt. Hadlock and James (2002) state that firms with high stock 
return volatility tend to have substantial information asymmetries between outsider and 
insiders. They find that undervalued firms tend to use bank debt. Thus, a direct relationship 
between bank-debt ratio and stock return volatility is expected. We measure the volatility by 
the standard deviation of weekly stock returns over the previous year, matched to the month 
of firms' fiscal year-end. 
 
Change in Stock Price: MacKie-Mason (1990) contends that a rising share price of a 
company implies that the investors are convinced about the improving prospects of the firm. 
Such firms can raise public debt at favourable terms. Thus, a negative relation is expected 
between bank-debt ratio and change (increase) in share price. We measure this variable as 
the first difference of the log of annual share price, with a six-month lag to allow for a time 
gap between the decision making process and the issuance of debt, matched to the month 
of firms' fiscal year-end. 
 
Term Structure of Interest Rates: Kashyap et al. (1993) argue that tight monetary policies 
increase the cost of banks’ capital, which in turn discourages firms from borrowing from 
banks. Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) suggest that lenders would not be funding low-quality 
firms under such conditions. UK firms rely on capital markets while German firms on banks 
for financing. Thus, as highlighted by Bolton and Freixas (2000), the effect of monetary 
policies on corporate sector may not be similar across the sample countries. Mayer (1994) 
argues that the credit constraints have much more pronounced impact on the real sector in a 
bank-based economy than in a market-based economy. Our models, which incorporate the 
term-structure of interest rates, are expected to shed light on these issues. We measure the 
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term structure is as the difference between the month-end yields on long-term government 
bond and three-month treasury-bills, with a six-month lag, matched to the month of firms' 
fiscal year-end. 
 
Fixed Assets Ratio: Boot et al. (1991) predict that the firms with potential collateral are likely 
to issue bank loan. James (1996) emphasises that almost all bank debts of financially 
distressed firms are secured while public debts are rarely secured. In addition, Berger and 
Udell (1995) argue that some banks specialise in lending to the firms with substantial 
asymmetric information problems. These can be reflected in the nature of loan contract 
terms such as the rate of interest rate and collateral. Edwards and Fischer (1994) state that 
collateral seems to be one of the requirements for the majority of bank loans in Germany 
and the UK. We measure the fixed asset ratio (a proxy of collateral) with the ratio of net 
tangible assets to total assets and expect a positive relation between this ratio and bank 
debt. 
 
 
III. THE SAMPLE AND DATA  
 
Motivated by the objective of comparing the determinants of debt ownership structure in a 
market-oriented economy and a bank-oriented economy we analyse the cases of British and 
German firms. The sample includes all non-financial firms (dead or alive) traded in their 
domestic stock exchanges. The sample period, guided by data availability, starts from 1969 
for the UK, and from 1987 for Germany and ends in 2000. To allow for a dynamic model 
estimation firms with less than 6 consecutive observations are excluded from the sample. 
The final dataset after some filtering comprises 1,813 UK firms with 33,010 observations and 
498 German firms with 6,447 observations. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
 
The descriptive statistics (Table I), as expected in a bank-oriented economy, show that 
German firms have substantially higher bank-debt ratio (BANK-TOTAL) (94.5 %) than that of 
the UK firms (60.5%). In Germany, the short-term bank debt payable within one year is 
45.4% of the total debt (BANK-SHORT) while the long-term bank debt payable after five 
years (BANK-LONG>5) is only 16.1% of the total debt. This suggests that the German firms 
rely on banks primarily for short-term loan. Comparing the ratios of long-term bank debt 
payable after one year to total debt (BANK-LONG>1) in Germany and the UK, one can see 
the discernible difference between the ratios as it is 49.4% for the former and 14% for the 
latter. This implies relatively lower contribution of the banks in financing the corporate sector 
in the UK. However, their importance in short term finance is noticeable.  
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“TAKE IN TABLE I” 
 
Annual average bank-debt ratios in Germany range between 90% and 96%. However, this 
ratio has been declining since 1996 and takes its lowest value in 2000. The reduction is 
reflected in long-term bank debt ratios. On the contrary, average short-term bank debt ratio 
is increasing. This trend implies that the German firms are switching from long-term debts to 
short-term debts but not at the same magnitude. In the UK, there is an apparent increase in 
the average long-term bank-debt ratio. It reached 26.5% in 2000 from 11.9% in 1983. On the 
other hand, the short-term bank debt ratio declined from 45.4% in 1969 to 33.3% in 2000. 
The overall bank-debt ratio has two distinct patterns during the sample period. During 1969-
1985, the ratio fluctuated between 42.8% and 74.6% while during 1986-2000 it declined from 
72.4% to 59.8%. 
 
 
IV. THE MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Unlike most previous studies on corporate debt ownership, we use panel data. Advantages 
of using panel data include increase in the degrees of freedom, more variability and 
reduction in colinearity among regressors. These advantages provide more efficient 
estimations.  
 
The Model   
A dynamic model is applied in investigating the potential determinants of corporate debt 
ownership structure (bank-debt ratio). In equation (1), a partial adjustment model,  (the 
constant), ,  and  are parameters to be estimated; i are firm-specific factors which 
remain constant overtime (e.g., firm reputation), t are time-varying factors which do not vary 
across firms (e.g., economic recession), it is the disturbance term which is assumed to be 
serially uncorrelated with mean zero and variance σ2. 
 
it
k k
titkikkitktiit XXDEBTBANKDEBTBANK
1 1
)1()1( ***   (1) 
The vectors of explanatory variables, Xs, in equation (1) are current and lagged values of 
potential debt ownership determinants representing the Liquidation and reorganisation 
hypothesis (Debt maturity, Leverage, Liquidity and Interest coverage ratio); the Moral hazard 
and adverse selection hypothesis (Growth opportunities, Firm quality, Dividend payout ratio 
and Earnings volatility); the Flotation costs hypothesis (Firm size). The control factors 
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included in the model are stock return volatility, changes in stock price, term-structure of 
interest rates and fixed assets ratio [7]. 
 
Estimation Techniques 
Recent developments in econometrics confirm the superiority of the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) technique in estimating the models such as equation (1) (see, for instance, 
Blundell and Bond, 1998). We apply two versions of the GMM technique: (a) difference-
GMM (GMM-DIF) and (b) system-GMM (GMM-SYS). In GMM-DIF, the model is estimated in 
first-differences using level regressors as instruments to control for unobservable firm 
heterogeneity (see Arellano and Bond, 1991, among others). In GMM-SYS, the model is 
estimated in both levels and first-differences, i.e., level-equations are simultaneously 
estimated using differenced lagged regressors as instruments. In this way, apart from 
controlling for individual heterogeneity, variations between firms could partially be retained. 
 
One of the motivations for using panel data is to control for unobservable firm heterogeneity. 
It is also difficult to establish exogeneity between the regressors and error term especially in 
company financial data. Thus, owing to potential endogeneity, the direction of causality 
between variables might be ambiguous. Consequently, using the contemporaneous 
observations for both dependent variable and its determinants may cause spurious results. 
We control for this problem by employing a GMM technique. 
 
Optimal Debt Ownership Structure and the Speed of Adjustment  
 
Due to adjustment costs firms may not be able to adjust their financing structure promptly 
and a delay is highly likely. We investigate this possibility by adopting a partial adjustment 
process. We apply the following procedure to search for the existence of target debt 
ownership structure. Assuming that the desired level of
*
itDEBTBANK  is determined by 
several explanatory variables, then:, 
 
1
*
k
itkitkit xDEBTBANK                                                     (2) 
where ωit is the disturbance term which is serially correlated with mean zero and possibly 
heteroscedastic, and ψk's are parameters to be estimated that are common to all firms. The 
model assumes that firms adjust their current ratios, BANK DEBTit, with the degree of 
adjustment coefficient "θ" to attain the target debt ownership structure. 
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)( 1
*
1 itititit DEBTBANKDEBTBANKDEBTBANKDEBTBANK     (3) 
 
A unit of θ suggests that the actual and desired changes in bank-debt ratio are equal and 
firms adjust to their target ratio without any delay (θ = 1). This is possible when transaction 
costs are negligible. However, θ = 0 implies no adjustment due to unaffordable transaction 
costs and firms will set their current bank debt-ratios to its past value. Thus, θ is inversely 
proportional to transaction costs. Substituting (2) into (3), we obtain the following equation: 
 
t
k
kitkitit xDEBTBANKDEBTBANK
1
1)1(                                                   (4) 
This adjustment model (equation 4) assumes that the adjustment coefficient θ lies between 
zero and unity because of the presence of transaction costs. If the cost of being in 
disequilibrium is higher (lower) than the cost of adjustment, θ tends to unity (zero). 
 
V.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We estimate the above models using three different dependent variables: (a) total bank-debt 
ratio (b) short-term bank-debt ratio, and (c) long-term bank-debt ratio (payable after one 
year). We also split the UK data into two sub-sample periods: 1969-2000 and 1983-2000. 
The comparison of results between the UK and Germany is primarily based on the model of 
total bank-debt ratio.  
 
5.1 Dynamic Debt Ownership Structure 
The GMM results in panel A of Tables II to V reveal that our model captures the dynamics in 
firms’ debt ownership decisions. The significant but less than unit coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variables (LDV) imply costly and non-instantaneous adjustment process [8, 9]. 
The GMM estimates show a common pattern in the adjustment speed [θ=1-(coefficient of 
LDV)] for both countries. The adjustment process is quicker for shorter-term bank debt. The 
adjustment coefficients of total bank-debt ratio indicate that the UK firms are quicker in 
adjusting the debt ownership structure towards their desired level than their German counter 
parts. The slower adjustment by German firms could be because of relatively high 
adjustment cost or the cost of being off the target is insignificant. Overall, the results show 
that firms in these countries attempt to trade-off between the cost of being off-target and the 
cost of adjustment.  
 
“TAKE IN TABLE II, TABLE III, TABLE IV AND TABLE V” 
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Liquidation and renegotiation hypothesis 
Debt Maturity: As predicted by the liquidation and renegotiation hypothesis the relationship 
between debt maturity and bank-debt ratio is negative in both countries. It confirms that firms 
tend to borrow short-term loans from banking system.  
 
Leverage: In the case of Germany only the lagged leverage in the short-run model is 
significantly negatively associated with the bank-debt ratio (BANK-TOTAL) although the 
coefficients in other cases are negative. This offers partial support to Drukarcyk et al.'s. 
(1985) view that debt-ratio is one of the most important factors in Germany to get bank loan. 
Considering the leverage as a proxy of financial distress, these results are not surprising in 
terms of prevailing German bankruptcy rules, which allow for liquidation rather than 
reorganisation. These findings support Diamond's view that firms with high debt ratios may 
restrict their bank borrowing to avoid liquidation and frequent renegotiations. In the UK, the 
relationship between leverage and BANK-TOTAL is significant and positive in all cases [10]. 
This direct association is in line with Hoshi et al. (1993) who imply that highly-levered firms 
use private debt. 
 
Liquidity: The estimates show that bank debt is inversely associated with firms' liquidity in 
the UK (Tables III and V; and especially for the period 1969-2000). Hence, it seems that 
liquid UK firms avoid borrowing from banks possibly due to hold-up problems or monitoring 
costs, which are not specific to arm's-length public debt. It is also possible that higher 
internal liquidity reduces the need for short-term loans which primarily come from banks. On 
the other hand, the liquidity factor does not seem to have any significant impact on German 
firms’ debt-mix choice. 
 
Interest Coverage: The interest coverage ratio does not affect firms' debt ownership 
decisions in Germany at any meaningful level [11]. It is possible that firms in Germany have 
very high coverage ratio (Table I) and hence this factor is not considered as a significant risk 
factor by the managers. In the UK, the coefficient estimate of interest coverage is significant 
and negative only for the static long-run results (Table V, panel B). This finding lends some 
support to Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) who argue that firms with low probability of 
financial distress prefer to raise public debt to reduce interest expenses. 
 
Overall, the ‘liquidation and renegotiation’ hypothesis receives some support from both the 
UK and Germany. 
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Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection hypothesis 
Growth Opportunities: Estimates show that there is no meaningful relation between growth 
opportunities (MKT-TO-BOOK) and the use of bank debt (BANK-TOTAL) in Germany. It thus 
seems that costs related to information asymmetries, agency conflicts and monitoring, and 
hold-up problems are not widespread in this country. This is possibly due to their corporate 
governance structure that largely mitigates agency and asymmetric information problems 
[12]. On the other hand, except for the 1969-2000 (Table V), an inverse relation between 
bank debt ratio and MKT-TO-BOOK is found in the UK [13]. This negative relation implies 
that banks focus their lending on tangible assets of the firm but not on the firms with 
intangible growth opportunities (supply side). Alternatively, firms with profitable growth 
opportunities restrict their bank borrowings due to potential hold-up problems in the UK 
(demand side) [14]. 
 
Firm Quality: The difference-GMM estimates in Tables II and III reveal that the impact of firm 
quality on debt replacement decisions is not substantial in any country. The insignificant 
effect of firm quality in shaping debt ownership structure may be due to their existing close 
relation with the banks and their borrowing tradition for German firms. However, the system-
GMM estimates in Tables IV and V depict a different picture. Firm quality tends to influence 
BANK-TOTAL significantly and positively in both countries. This observed positive relation is 
possible if the undervalued firms with better future prospects borrow from better informed 
private lenders (banks). This largely mitigates the information asymmetry problem and firms 
are revalued to their equilibrium levels.  
 
Dividend Payout Ratio: The association between BANK-TOTAL and dividend payout ratios is 
country-dependent. It is significantly negative in the UK (Table III, 1969-2000) and 
significantly positive in Germany (Table II). This implies that firms in the UK avoid the 
adverse consequences of issuing public debt when they cut dividend payments. Hence, the 
information content of paying dividends with respect to firms' growth prospects and future 
cash stream seems to be prevalent in the UK. On the other hand, the positive relation in 
Germany remains a puzzle where banks are both financiers and shareholders. However, 
why firms pay dividends (essentially to the banks themselves) and then borrow from the 
banks remains a puzzle. 
 
Earnings Volatility: The system-GMM results show that the earnings volatility (DISTRESS) 
has a significant and negative effect on BANK-TOTAL in the cases of UK firms (Table V, 
1969-2000) while it remains insignificant in Germany. The finding that UK firms with high 
volatile earnings issue public debt contradicts the predictions of the adverse selection 
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hypothesis and the findings of Johnson (1997). However, it is possible that firms with high 
volatile earnings do not want close monitoring and minimise bank borrowings. Unlike the 
German firms, because of well developed public debt market in the UK, British firms may 
have the luxury of choosing their lenders.  
 
Overall, the discussion above offers mixed support to the moral hazard and adverse 
selection hypothesis. It receives strong support from the UK but not from Germany. The 
evidence suggests that corporate governance, the level of development of public debt 
market and the degree of information asymmetry affect the choice of the lender.  
 
Flotation costs hypothesis 
Firm Size: Consistent with the evidence in the literature our results for both Germany and the 
UK (Table III) confirm a significant negative relation between firm size and bank loan. Hence, 
the hypothesis that small firms avoid issuing public debt due to high flotation costs receives 
strong support [15]. Furthermore, the argument that small firms are immature, riskier, and 
have relatively high growth options, thus, tend not to borrow from public debt market are also 
confirmed.   
 
The control factors 
The estimates show that the association of bank-debt ratio with stock return volatility varies 
across countries. It is surprising that UK firms with low volatile stock prices are more likely to 
issue bank debt. In Germany, however, BANK-TOTAL is not influenced by return volatility. 
An increase in share price (change in stock price) may represent firms' quality and convince 
the public debt-holders about their future prospects. However, the association of bank-debt 
ratio with share performance is insignificant in Germany. The expected inverse relation is 
found for British firms only (Table V). Furthermore, the estimates show that the association 
of bank debt use (BANK-TOTAL) with term structure of interest rates is country-dependent. 
In Germany, it has a significant positive coefficient while it is negative in the UK. Hence, one 
can conclude that when long-term interest rates are relatively higher, UK firms are reluctant 
to raise bank debt while German firms tend to issue bank debt. Similarly, the results with 
respect to the asset collateral (FIXED-ASSETS) are also country-dependent. The positive 
impact of collateral on choosing bank debt use in Germany could be due to banks' 
requirements for collateral while lending [16]. The direction of the association of collateral 
with BANK-TOTAL in the UK is the opposite of what we found in Germany. 
 
In general, estimates above provide strong empirical support to the liquidation and 
reorganisation hypothesis and the flotation costs hypotheses in both the UK and Germany. 
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However, the moral hazard and adverse selection hypothesis receives support only from the 
UK evidence.  
 
 
5.2 Maturity Structure of Bank Debt 
 
We replaced the dependent variable total bank-debt ratio (BANK-TOTAL) by short-term and 
long-term bank debt ratios and re-estimated the models [17]. For Germany, the results show 
that the choice of dependent variable is important for some explanatory variables. The 
association of liquidity with BANK-SHORT and BANK-LONG>1 is significant and negative in 
all estimates, which was not the case when the dependent variable was BANK-TOTAL. 
Similarly, the coefficient estimate of COVERAGE is significant and positive when the 
dependent variable is short-term or long-term bank debt ratio. The coefficient on market-to-
book ratio gets significant with a negative sign (Table IV, BANK-SHORT). Another notable 
finding is that size is negatively correlated with BANK-LONG>1 but positively correlated with 
BANK-SHORT. It thus seems that larger German firms tend to prefer bank debt with a 
shorter maturity. An unexpected negative impact of earnings volatility on short and log-term 
bank debt use is found (Table IV, DISTRESS variable). Another unexpected finding is the 
significant and negative correlation between firm quality and BANK-LONG>1 (Table II). 
Finally, fixed-assets ratio variable exerts a significant and negative influence on both BANK-
SHORT and BANK-LONG>1. 
 
The estimates from the UK reveal that the results are sensitive to the choice of dependent 
variable. The associations of leverage with BANK-SHORT and BANK-TOTAL are the same 
for the short-term results (panel A) but they differ for static long-term results (panel B). All 
three alternative depend variables produce the same type of association with the market-to-
book ratio with respect to the difference-GMM estimates. However, based on the system-
GMM estimates in Table V, the expected negative influence of future growth opportunities is 
consistently prevalent only for the dependent variable BANK-SHORT. Another result 
sensitive to dependent-variable choice is due to the firm quality variable, which is significant 
and positive for BANK-LONG>1 only (Table III). A rather unanticipated result is the positive 
relationship between payout ratio and BANK-SHORT (Table III). As expected, a direct and 
significant relation between DISTRESS and BANK-SHORT is found which was insignificant 
for the dependent variable BANK-TOTAL. This finding implies that firms with more volatile 
earnings tend to prefer shorter-term bank loan. Moreover, an interesting finding is that firm 
size is positively correlated with BANK-LONG>1 but negatively correlated with BANK-
SHORT, which is the opposite case in Germany. Hence, larger British firms seem to prefer 
bank loan with a longer maturity. Using the short-term and long-term bank debt ratio as 
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dependent variables does not produce any significant coefficient estimates on return 
volatility in Table III. However, the results in Table V for this explanatory variable with 
respect to the same dependent variables confirm the original findings. There is no any 
notable difference regarding the liquidity, fixed-assets ratio, term structure of interest rates, 
share price performance and interest coverage variables.  
 
Overall, the estimates for the UK seem to be more robust than for Germany. This shows that 
the validity of the theories of debt ownership developed from the US market are more 
sustainable in the UK than in Germany indicating the prominent role of the financial structure 
of the country. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
The factors affecting the corporate debt ownership structure in Germany and the UK are 
analysed in the context of three hypotheses: (a) liquidation and renegotiation, (b) moral 
hazard and adverse selection, and (c) flotation costs. The results suggest that the degree 
and type of association of debt ownership structure and firm specific factors are dependent 
on country’s financial and corporate governance traditions in which they operate. Several 
interesting findings emerge. 
 
First, the evidence from both countries indicates that firms have a target debt ownership 
structure and the UK firms adjust their debt ownership structure more quickly. Second, the 
results from the UK support the predictions of the renegotiation and liquidation hypotheses. 
Maturity of debt, interest coverage, liquidity and leverage ratios always inversely affect the 
use of bank debt in at least one country. However, the findings based on the above variables 
reveal some country differences. For instance, leverage has a positive impact on bank debt 
use in the UK but it has an inverse effect in Germany; while liquidity and bank-debt ratio are 
negatively associated in the UK but nor related in Germany. Third, we find an inverse 
relation between the use of bank-debt and growth opportunities of the British firms. This 
relationship is statistically insignificant in Germany, which may suggest that agency conflicts 
and information asymmetries can be mitigated under German corporate governance system. 
Fourth, the moral hazard and adverse selection hypothesis receives strong support in the 
UK but not in Germany. Firm quality and bank-debt use are strongly and positively correlated 
in the UK while the degree of this association is not substantial in Germany. Hence, the 
concerns about obtaining a better-informed lender to mitigate adverse selection problems 
are not that significant for German firms but very important for the UK firms. In addition, UK 
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non-dividend paying firms or firms cutting their dividends avoid issuing public debt; but the 
case is opposite in Germany. Similarly, earnings volatility does not affect debt decisions of 
German firms but it positively affects bank-debt ratio of the UK firms. Fifth, confirming the 
predictions of the flotation cost hypothesis the evidence suggests that the smaller firms 
prefer bank loan against public debt in both countries. Finally, the estimates reveal the 
importance of several market related control factors in the model. Stock return volatility and 
positive performance in share prices reduce the amount of bank debt used by UK firms, 
relatively high (low) long-term interest rates inspires the German (British) managers to 
borrow from bank. Overall, the findings confirm that the debt ownership decision of listed 
firms is not only the result of their own characteristics but also the outcome of legal and 
financial environment and corporate governance traditions in which they operate. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1. The notable exceptions are Anderson and Makhija (1999) and Hoshi et al. (1993) on Japanese 
data, Saà-Requejo (1996) on Spanish data and Esho et al. (2001) on international data. 
 
2. An alternative measure of leverage we use is the ratio of book value of total debt to market value of 
equity plus book value of total debt.  
 
3. Carey et al. (1993) note that US firms with takeover plans rely on private placement to protect the 
confidentiality of their transactions.  
 
4. Houston and James (1996) document that high-growth US firms relying on a single bank and 
having no public debt issue have relatively low bank debt. This implies the presence of the hold-up 
problem and highlights the importance of diversification of debt financing sources for such firms. 
 
5. Alternative measures of growth opportunities used are depreciation expense to total assets 
(Krishnaswami et al. 1999) and the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. 
 
6. Datta et al. (1999) provide empirical support to Diamond's reputation hypothesis. They find the 
length of firm-bank relationship significantly reduces the at-issue yield spread, thus, the cost of 
external debt. 
 
7. We also examine the long-run relation between the dependent variable and the regressors. In 
equation (1) the long-run coefficients of the regressor X is ( + )/(1- ) while the short-run coefficients 
for the current and lagged values of X are  and  (not reported in the tables), respectively. The 
parameters in the model are obtained using a dynamic estimation of equation (1). See Antoniou et al. 
(2006). 
 
8. As expected, difference-GMM method produces lower LDV coefficients than system-GMM (Blundell 
and Bond, 1998). 
 
9. Cantillo and Wright (2000), and Hoshi et al. (1993) also report significantly positive estimated 
coefficients of LDV. 
 
10. The results are based on book-leverage. The use of market-leverage does not qualitatively alter 
the results.  
 
11. Leverage could also serve as a proxy for financial distress. Thus, we re-estimated the model 
excluding leverage but the results are qualitatively similar. 
 
12. Easterwood and Kadapakkam (1991), Esho et al. (2001), Hadlock and James (2002) and Hoshi et 
al. (1993) also report insignificant coefficient of MKT-TO-BOOK. 
 
13. The studies reporting significantly negative MKT-TO-BOOK coefficient include Houston and 
James (1996) for firms with single bank relation and MacKie-Mason (1990). 
 
14. Qualitatively the results remain the same with alternative measures of growth opportunities 
(depreciation ratio and intangible-assets ratio). 
 
15. When the firm size is measured by Ln(Total Sales) or Ln(Total Assets), qualitatively the results 
remain the same. 
 
16.
 
Esho et al. (2001), among others, report direct impact of collateral on bank debt choice. 
 
17. In this case, the maturity variable is dropped from the model due to its apparent correlation with 
the dependent variable. 
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
BANK-TOTAL is the ratio of total bank debt to total debt. BANK-SHORT is bank debt payable within one 
year; BANK-LONG>1 is bank debt payable after one year; BANK-LONG>5 is bank debt payable after 5 
years; all scaled by total debt. MATURITY is the ratio of debt that matures in more than one year to total 
debt. LEVERAGE1 is the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. LEVERAGE2 is 
the ratio of book value of total debt to market value of equity plus book value of total debt. MKT-TO-
BOOK is the ratio of book value of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity to 
book value of total assets, matched to the month of firms' fiscal year-end. DEPRECIATION is the ratio 
of depreciation expenses to total assets. INTANGIBLES is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets.  
SIZE1 (SIZE2) is the natural logarithm of total sales (total assets). SIZE3 is the natural logarithm of total 
assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. LIQUIDITY is the ratio of current assets 
to current liabilities. QUALITY is the difference between earnings per share in years (t+1) and (t) divided 
by share price in (t), matched to the month of firms' fiscal year-end. DIVIDEND is the dividend payout 
ratio; dividends to net earnings. PROFITABILITY is the ratio of EBITD to total assets. FIXED-ASSETS is 
the ratio of net tangible assets to total assets. COVERAGE is the ratio of EBITD to total interest 
expense. DISTRESS is the ratio of the sum of intangible assets and the difference between the 
standard deviation and expected value of EBIT to total assets (financial distress costs). RETURN VOL 
is the stock return volatility measured by the standard deviation of weekly stock returns over the 
previous year (return volatility), matched to the month of firms' fiscal year-end. SHARE PERF is the first 
difference of log of annual share prices (share performance), with a six-month lag, matched to the 
month of firms' fiscal year-end. TERM is term structure of interest rates measured as the difference 
between the month-end yields on long-term (10 years or more) government bond and three-months 
treasury-bills, with a six-month lag, matched to the month of firms' fiscal year-end.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Germany UK 
Variables Mean Median SDev Min Max Mean Median SDev Min Max 
           
BANK-TOTAL 0.945 0.988 0.152 0.000 1.000 0.605 0.694 0.362 0.000 1.000 
BANK-SHORT 0.454 0.409 0.311 0.000 1.000 0.463 0.416 0.357 0.000 1.000 
BANK-LONG>1 0.494 0.509 0.314 0.000 1.000 0.140 0.000 0.257 0.000 1.000 
BANK-LONG>5 0.161 0.080 0.205 0.000 1.000 - - - - - 
MATURITY 0.536 0.575 0.310 0.000 1.000 0.455 0.469 0.339 0.000 1.000 
LEVERAGE1 0.198 0.151 0.190 0.000 1.000 0.168 0.153 0.140 0.000 0.999 
LEVERAGE2 0.248 0.175 0.246 0.000 0.989 0.252 0.201 0.222 0.000 0.998 
MKT-TO-BOOK 1.895 1.301 3.557 0.282 90.55 1.383 1.081 1.651 0.121 98.67 
DEPRECIATION 0.060 0.053 0.051 0.000 0.967 0.036 0.030 0.032 0.000 1.863 
INTANGIBLES 0.028 0.005 0.059 0.000 0.519 0.036 0.000 0.129 0.000 14.97 
SIZE1 12.39 12.428 2.296 1.231 18.76 9.102 8.920 1.868 0.016 16.22 
SIZE2 12.30 12.19 2.006 4.534 19.13 8.880 8.614 1.823 1.502 16.67 
SIZE3 12.75 12.58 1.883 7.482 19.96 9.067 8.789 1.878 3.478 16.78 
LIQUIDITY 4.349 1.717 27.91 0.001 82.43 1.680 1.460 1.708 0.016 125.2 
QUALITY 0.016 0.000 1.359 -64.5 50.53 0.010 0.006 0.325 -41.7 26.79 
DIVIDEND 0.297 0.013 6.13 -125 191.7 0.399 0.366 3.239 -94.3 98.6 
PROFITABILITY 0.117 0.117 0.132 -2.92 1.742 0.125 0.129 0.135 -6.89 1.011 
FIXED-ASSETS 0.332 0.301 0.208 0.000 0.999 0.349 0.313 0.199 0.000 1.156 
COVERAGE 35.45 6.273 293.1 -3778 8936 46.70 7.50 438.4 -8074 37227 
DISTRESS  0.049 0.012 0.201 -0.91 3.989 0.136 0.0001 0.779 -3.34 36.15 
RETURN VOL 0.042 0.038 0.025 0.000 0.468 0.050 0.044 0.029 0.000 0.681 
SHARE PERF 0.008 0.000 0.333 -2.23 2.187 0.056 0.072 0.458 -4.18 3.268 
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        Table II: Corporate debt ownership structure in Germany; difference-GMM (specific approach) 
 
       See notes in Table I for variable definitions. Correlation 1 and 2 are first and second order 
autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under 
the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as χ
2
(df) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Test-1 tests the 
joint significance of estimated coefficients; asymptotically distributed as χ
2
(df) under the null of 
no relationship. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is 
rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Panel A:  
Dynamic model estimates 
Panel B: 
 Static long-run estimates 
Dependent Variables Dependent Variables 
Predicted  
                                Sign 
BANK-
TOTAL 
BANK-
SHORT 
BANK-
LONG>1 
BANK-
TOTAL 
BANK-
SHORT 
BANK-
LONG>1 
BANKi,t-1 + 0.6324*** 0.3674*** 0.3725*** - - - 
  (0.1038) (0.0641) (0.0671)    
MATURITYi,t - -0.0319*** - - -0.0867** - - 
  (0.0120)   (0.0400)   
LEVERAGEi,t +/- -0.0114 0.2019* -0.1382* -0.0309 -0.0287 0.0758 
  (0.0248) (0.1306) (0.0832) (0.0689) (0.2271) (0.2322) 
LIQUIDITYi,t +/- 0.0005 -0.0004** 0.0021** 0.0012 -0.0006* 0.0034** 
  (0.0004) (0.002) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0017) 
COVERAGEi,t - 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001* -0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00006) (0.0001) 
MKT-TO-BOOK i,t +/- -0.0001 0.0129 -0.0085 -0.0002 0.0205 -0.0135 
  (0.0026) (0.0247) (0.0215) (0.0072) (0.0390) (0.0343) 
QUALITYi,t + 0.0038 0.0003 -0.0066** 0.0102 0.0004 -0.0106* 
  (0.0026) (0.0104) (0.0033) (0.0074) (0.0164) (0.0059) 
DIVIDENDi,t - 0.0005* -0.0013 0.0065 0.0014* -0.0021 0.0103* 
  (0.0003) (0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0008) (0.0088) (0.0062) 
DISTRESSi,t + -0.0026 -0.2652 0.4186 -0.0070 0.2921 -0.0161 
  (0.0314) (0.2876) (0.4032) (0.0854) (0.4457) (0.5146) 
SIZEi,t - -0.0158** 0.0919* -0.0874* -0.0430* 0.1453* -0.1394** 
  (0.0080) (0.0502) (0.0487) (0.0248) (0.0883) (0.0711) 
RETURN VOL + 0.0110 -0.0939 -0.0359 0.0300 -0.1484 -0.0571 
  (0.0470) (0.3040) (0.2931) (0.1281) (0.4823) (0.4655) 
SHARE PERFORM - 0.0032 0.0087 -0.0094 0.0087 0.0138 -0.0150 
  (0.0026) (0.0158) (0.0150) (0.0071) (0.0253) (0.0246) 
TERM +/- 0.0061* 0.0109 -0.0089 0.0166* 0.0172 -0.0142 
  (0.0037) (0.0352) (0.0363) (0.0101) (0.0554) (0.0576) 
FIXED ASSETSi,t +/- 0.0403* -0.2868* 0.0268* 0.1097** -0.4534* 0.0428 
  (0.0242) (0.1616) (0.1614) (0.0489) (0.2778) (0.4123) 
Constant  0.0003 0.0024 -0.0038 0.0009 0.0038 -0.0060 
  (0.0005) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0013) (0.0050) (0.0057) 
Correlation1   -4.076*** -7.644*** -7.560***    
Correlation2   -0.684 -0.176 -0.306    
Sargan Test (df)  174(220) 114 (100) 115 (100)    
Wald Test-1 (df)  71 (14)*** 58 (15)*** 70 (15)***    
Firms  439 439 439    
Observations   3406 3405 3405    
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Table III: Corporate debt ownership structure in the UK. Panel A: difference-GMM (specific approach) 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Dependent Variables: 1969-2000 Dependent Variables: 1983-2000 
 BANK-
TOTAL 
BANK-
SHORT 
BANK-
LONG>1 
BANK-
TOTAL 
BANK-
SHORT 
BANK-
LONG>1 
BANKi,t-1 + 0.6250*** 0.5036*** 0.6844*** 0.4244*** 0.4894*** 0.5292*** 
  (0.0389) (0.0350) (0.0395) (0.0377) (0.0349) (0.0343) 
MATURITYi,t - -0.6682*** - - -0.1895*** - - 
  (0.0731)   (0.0513)   
LEVERAGEi,t +/- 0.4895*** 0.5373*** 0.0569 0.7019*** 0.5072*** 0.1040 
  (0.1551) (0.1778) (0.0544) (0.1322) (0.1446) (0.0773) 
LIQUIDITYi,t +/- -0.0205* -0.0699*** 0.0047 0.0074 -0.0367** 0.0151 
  (0.0120) (0.0231) (0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0186) (0.0161) 
COVERAGEi,t - 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
MKT-TO-BOOK i,t - -0.0147* -0.0252** -0.0038* -0.0189* -0.0185** -0.0064* 
  (0.0088) (0.0113) (0.0022) (0.0106) (0.0087) (0.0035) 
QUALITYi,t + 0.0285 0.0114 0.0242** 0.0104 -0.0061 0.0085** 
  (0.0361) (0.0188) (0.0123) (0.0116) (0.0051) (0.0042) 
DIVIDENDi,t - -0.0012** 0.0015 -0.0014 0.0048 0.0096** 0.0022 
  (0.0006) (0.0046) (0.0020) (0.0040) (0.0048) (0.0026) 
DISTRESSi,t + -0.0020 0.0142** -0.0043 0.0095 0.0136** 0.0139 
  (0.0102) (0.0063) (0.0083) (0.0262) (0.0068) (0.0142) 
SIZEi,t - -0.0366* -0.0571*** 0.0569*** -0.0332** -0.0502*** 0.0205* 
  (0.0202) (0.0158) (0.0215) (0.0169) (0.0186) (0.0122) 
RETURN VOL + -0.1000* -0.0439 -0.0061 -0.1751* -0.0557 -0.0556 
  (0.0610) (0.1032) (0.0780) (0.1054) (0.1226) (0.0995) 
SHARE PERFORM      - -0.0030 -0.0047** -0.0029* -0.0033 -0.0018 -0.0008 
  (0.0052) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0051) 
TERM +/- -0.0111* -0.0139** -0.0118** -0.0026* 0.0031 0.0070 
  (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0054) (0.0015) (0.0137) (0.0105) 
FIXED ASSETSi,t +/- -0.1817** -0.3810*** -0.0842 -0.0295 -0.0107 0.0509 
  (0.0092) (0.1248) (0.0981) (0.1279) (0.1296) (0.0923) 
Constant  0.0034*** -0.0011 0.0037*** -0.0033 -0.0032** -0.0007 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0011) 
Correlation1   -13.93*** -15.22*** -15.01*** -12.61*** -14.41*** -13.93*** 
Correlation2   1.174 1.618 1.347 1.249 1.478 1.336 
Sargan Test (df)  241 (292) 260 (267) 257 (266) 254 (285) 282 (257) 255 (259) 
Wald Test-1 (df)  1286 (19)*** 432 (16)*** 616 (17)*** 298 (15)*** 273 (16)*** 297(14)*** 
Firms  1726 1726 1732 1514 1514 1523 
Observations   23916 23876 24465 13605 13583 14138 
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Table III (continued): Panel B; static long-run results (UK) 
 See notes in Table I for variable definitions. Correlation 1 and 2 are first and second order autocorrelation 
of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ
2
(df) under 
the null of instruments' validity. Wald Test-1 tests the joint significance of estimated coefficients; 
asymptotically distributed as χ
2
(df) under the null of no relationship. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that 
coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Dependent Variables: 1969-2000 Dependent Variables: 1983-2000 
 BANK-
TOTAL 
BANK-
SHORT 
BANK-
LONG>1 
BANK-
TOTAL 
BANK-
SHORT 
BANK-
LONG>1 
MATURITYi,t - -0.8500*** - - -0.3292*** - - 
  (0.0933)   (0.0842)   
LEVERAGEi,t +/- 0.5856*** -0.0398 0.1803 0.5811*** 0.1935 0.2210* 
  (0.2250) (0.1946) (0.1703) (0.1581) (0.1994) (0.1321) 
LIQUIDITYi,t +/- -0.0548* -0.1408*** -0.1267*** 0.0129 -0.0718* 0.0321 
  (0.0307) (0.0438) (0.0427) (0.0212) (0.0415) (0.0338) 
COVERAGEi,t - -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
MKT-TO-BOOK i,t - -0.0392* -0.0507** -0.0121* -0.0328* -0.0361** -0.0135* 
  (0.0237) (0.0226) (0.0071) (0.0189) (0.0172) (0.0080) 
QUALITYi,t + 0.0876 0.0230 0.1072** 0.0181 -0.0260** 0.0316** 
  (0.0985) (0.0380) (0.0476) (0.0202) (0.0131) (0.0144) 
DIVIDENDi,t - -0.0031** -0.0006 -0.0044 0.0083 0.0189** 0.0048 
  (0.0015) (0.0151) (0.0064) (0.0070) (0.0096) (0.0054) 
DISTRESSi,t + -0.0053 0.0163** -0.0136 0.0165 0.0109** 0.0296 
  (0.0273) (0.0077) (0.0263) (0.0454) (0.0054) (0.0298) 
SIZEi,t - -0.0901** -0.1150*** 0.0643** -0.0577** -0.0982*** 0.0436** 
  (0.0433) (0.0314) (0.0329) (0.0294) (0.0358) (0.0221) 
RETURN VOL + -0.2667* -0.0885 -0.0192 -0.3041* -0.1092 -0.1181 
  (0.1618) (0.2093) (0.2474) (0.1829) (0.2414) (0.2113) 
SHARE PERF.      - -0.0080 -0.0095** -0.0093* -0.0057 -0.0034 -0.0017 
  (0.0138) (0.0048) (0.0056) (0.0114) (0.0127) (0.0109) 
TERM +/- -0.0295* -0.0279** -0.0374** -0.0046* 0.0061 0.0148 
  (0.0177) (0.0140) (0.0180) (0.0027) (0.0268) (0.0223) 
FIXED ASSETSi,t +/- 0.2095 -0.7674*** 0.1772 0.0513 -0.0210 0.1082 
  (0.2702) (0.2501) (0.1875) (0.2224) (0.2536) (0.1960) 
Constant  0.0091*** -0.0023 0.0116*** -0.0057 -0.0062** -0.0016 
  (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0024) 
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        Table IV: Corporate debt ownership structure in Germany; system-GMM (specific approach) 
 
         See notes in Table I for variable definitions. Industry dummies are included in all models. 
Correlation 1 and 2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of  no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ
2
(df) under the null of instruments' 
validity. Wald Tests 1 and 2 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, and of industry 
dummies, respectively; asymptotically distributed as χ
2
(df) under the null of no relationship. (*), (**) 
and (***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Panel A:  
Dynamic model estimates 
Panel B: 
 Static long-run estimates 
Dependent Variables Dependent Variables 
Predicted  
                                Sign 
BANK-
TOTAL 
BANK-
SHORT 
BANK-
LONG>1 
BANK-
TOTAL 
BANK-
SHORT 
BANK-
LONG>1 
BANKi,t-1 + 0.7751*** 0.4575*** 0.4577*** - - - 
  (0.0733) (0.0432) (0.0407)    
MATURITYi,t - -0.0530*** - - -0.1546*** - - 
  (0.0203)   (0.0574)   
LEVERAGEi,t +/- -0.0145 -0.0158 0.0431 -0.0644 -0.0291 0.0787 
  (0.0116) (0.0714) (0.0744) (0.0553) (0.1317) (0.1356) 
LIQUIDITYi,t +/- 0.0002 -0.0030*** -0.0016 0.0009 -0.0079*** -0.0064*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0026) (0.0022) 
COVERAGEi,t - 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0002** 0.0003* 
  (0.0001) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
MKT-TO-BOOK i,t +/- -0.0001 -0.0258** -0.0174 -0.0004 -0.0476** -0.0317 
  (0.0028) (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0123) (0.0229) (0.0239) 
QUALITYi,t + 0.0030* 0.0019 0.0033 0.0136* 0.0035 0.0061 
  (0.0017) (0.0041) (0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0076) (0.0157) 
DIVIDENDi,t - 0.0007 0.0001* -0.0004 0.0033 0.0001* -0.0008 
  (0.0008) (0.00006) (0.0012) (0.0036) (0.00006) (0.0021) 
DISTRESSi,t + -0.0047 -0.4331** -0.3787** -0.0211 -0.1824* 0.2269 
  (0.0110) (0.1772) (0.1902) (0.0487) (0.1090) (0.1956) 
SIZEi,t - -0.0027** 0.0203 -0.0058 -0.0120** -0.0084 -0.0106** 
  (0.0013) (0.0232) (0.0079) (0.0061) (0.0150) (0.0054) 
RETURN VOL + 0.0079 0.1425 0.1794 0.0350 0.2626 0.3271 
  (0.0392) (0.2495) (0.2398) (0.1747) (0.4591) (0.4367) 
SHARE PERFORM - 0.0000 -0.0113 -0.0075 0.0002 -0.0209 -0.0136 
  (0.0023) (0.0117) (0.0108) (0.0104) (0.0214) (0.0196) 
TERM +/- 0.0044* 0.0099 0.0055 0.0196* 0.0182 0.0100 
  (0.0026) (0.0283) (0.0275) (0.0117) (0.0520) (0.0499) 
FIXED ASSETSi,t +/- 0.0408** -0.2960*** -0.2662** 0.1815* -0.5457*** -0.4856** 
  (0.0169) (0.1036) (0.1133) (0.0965) (0.1870) (0.2044) 
Constant  0.2474*** 0.4502*** 0.4384*** 1.1004*** 0.8298*** 0.7995*** 
  (0.0781) (0.1463) (0.1433) (0.1134) (0.2652) (0.2561) 
Correlation1   -4.760*** -8.891*** -9.023***    
Correlation2   -0.414 0.399 0.219    
Sargan Test (df)  184 (230) 227 (207) 210 (208)    
Wald Test-1 (df)  348 (15)*** 266 (16)*** 286 (15)***    
Wald Test-2 (df)  13.8 (14) 49 (14)*** 39 (14)***    
R
2 
 0.7653 0.4666 0.4654    
Firms  439 438 439    
Observations   3845 3834 3844    
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Table V: Corporate debt ownership structure in the UK. Panel A: system-GMM (specific approach) 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Dependent Variables: 1969-2000 Dependent Variables: 1983-2000 
 BANK-
TOTAL 
BANK-
SHORT 
BANK-
LONG>1 
BANK-
TOTAL 
BANK-
SHORT 
BANK-
LONG>1 
BANKi,t-1 + 0.7675*** 0.6431*** 0.9378*** 0.7245*** 0.6304*** 0.7150*** 
  (0.0250) (0.0292) (0.0207) (0.0306) (0.0356) (0.0325) 
MATURITYi,t - -0.6760*** - - -0.2089*** - - 
  (0.0538)   (0.0634)   
LEVERAGEi,t +/- 0.4105*** 0.4124*** -0.0370 0.3986*** 0.4066*** -0.0392* 
  (0.1407) (0.1247) (0.0361) (0.1416) (0.1407) (0.0230) 
LIQUIDITYi,t +/- -0.0200*** -0.0432*** 0.0005 -0.0041 -0.0214** 0.0043 
  (0.0070) (0.0165) (0.0073) (0.0123) (0.0101) (0.0117) 
COVERAGEi,t - -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
MKT-TO-BOOK i,t - 0.0023 -0.0281*** 0.0076** -0.0252*** -0.0188*** -0.0054 
  (0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0032) (0.0093) (0.0062) (0.0055) 
QUALITYi,t + 0.0729** 0.0151 0.0269** 0.0176 0.0082 0.0190*** 
  (0.0369) (0.0224) (0.0127) (0.0175) (0.0181) (0.0066) 
DIVIDENDi,t - -0.0014 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0025 0.0006 -0.0004 
  (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0012) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0021) 
DISTRESSi,t + -0.1246** 0.0042* -0.0900** 0.0159 0.0127** 0.0103 
  (0.0553) (0.0025) (0.0438) (0.0123) (0.0062) (0.0083) 
SIZEi,t - -0.0048 -0.0311*** 0.0004** 0.0063 -0.0237*** 0.0145*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0056) (0.0002) (0.0068) (0.0081) (0.0054) 
RETURN VOL + -0.2125** -0.1288* -0.0709 -0.1237* -0.0923** -0.0237 
  (0.1027) (0.0775) (0.0575) (0.0074) (0.0470) (0.0815) 
SHARE PERFORM      - -0.0022* 0.0013 -0.0029* -0.0031* 0.0069 -0.0061* 
  (0.0012) (0.0047) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0063) (0.0035) 
TERM +/- -0.0210** -0.0122* -0.0102*** 0.0004 -0.0151* 0.0064 
  (0.0096) (0.0070) (0.0038) (0.0109) (0.0082) (0.0090) 
FIXED ASSETSi,t +/- -0.3307** -0.3022** -0.0267* -0.0395 -0.0693 -0.0465 
  (0.1624) (0.1395) (0.0160) (0.0589) (0.0645) (0.0487) 
Constant  0.2388*** 0.5171*** 0.0501 0.1571** 0.4291*** -0.0437 
  (0.0692) (0.0819) (0.0352) (0.0795) (0.1075) (0.0665) 
Correlation1   -14.94*** -14.49*** -12.37*** -13.38*** -14.27*** -13.31*** 
Correlation2   1.681 1.524 1.373 1.418 1.672 1.293 
Sargan Test (df)  447 (432) 572 (544) 409 (378) 303 (294) 309 (294) 311 (297) 
Wald Test-1 (df)  4078 (19)*** 1218 (19)*** 5255 (17)*** 732 (17)*** 697 (17)*** 623 (14)*** 
Wald Test-2 (df)  56.7 (15)*** 85.1 (15)*** 9.55 (15) 51.6 (15)*** 68.6 (15)*** 13.9 (15) 
R
2 
 0.6203 0.5810 0.4916 0.5659 0.5139 0.4786 
Firms  1726 1726 1729 1512 1514 1523 
Observations   25613 25602 26035 15056 15091 15661 
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Table V (continued): Panel B; static long-run results (UK) 
See notes in Table I for variable definitions. Industry dummies are included in all models. Correlation 1 and 
2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as χ
2
(df) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests 1 and 2 test the joint 
significance of estimated coefficients, and of industry dummies, respectively; asymptotically distributed as 
χ
2
(df) under the null of no relationship. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the 
relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Dependent Variables: 1969-2000 Dependent Variables: 1983-2000 
 BANK-
TOTAL 
BANK-
SHORT 
BANK-
LONG>1 
BANK-
TOTAL 
BANK-
SHORT 
BANK-
LONG>1 
MATURITYi,t - -0.7498*** - - -0.1689 - - 
  (0.1077)   (0.1432)   
LEVERAGEi,t +/- 0.2463* -0.0158 -0.5939 0.2536* 0.0759 -0.1374 
  (0.1388) (0.1812) (0.6413) (0.1314) (0.1991) (0.1606) 
LIQUIDITYi,t +/- -0.0861*** -0.0245* -0.2446* -0.0149 -0.0579* 0.0151 
  (0.0296) (0.0144) (0.1309) (0.0446) (0.0307) (0.0409) 
COVERAGEi,t - -0.0003*** -0.0001* -0.0022* 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.00006) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
MKT-TO-BOOK i,t - 0.0097 -0.0787*** 0.1227** -0.0914*** -0.0509*** -0.0189 
  (0.0298) (0.0187) (0.0559) (0.0342) (0.0172) (0.0194) 
QUALITYi,t + 0.3668** 0.0098 0.7149** 0.0640 -0.0074 0.1097*** 
  (0.1771) (0.0668) (0.3087) (0.0644) (0.0523) (0.0308) 
DIVIDENDi,t - -0.0060 -0.0114 0.0013 0.0091 -0.0312** -0.0015 
  (0.0100) (0.0120) (0.0192) (0.0106) (0.0154) (0.0072) 
DISTRESSi,t + -0.2857** 0.0012* -0.7440** 0.0576 0.0120* 0.0362 
  (0.1212) (0.0007) (0.3668) (0.0444) (0.0068) (0.0293) 
SIZEi,t - -0.0205 -0.0872*** 0.0060** 0.0229 -0.0640*** 0.0509*** 
  (0.0252) (0.0138) (0.0030) (0.0244) (0.0199) (0.0183) 
RETURN VOL + -0.9142** -0.3608** -1.1388* -0.4490** -0.2498** -0.0831 
  (0.4445) (0.1820) (0.6834) (0.2072) (0.1268) (0.2854) 
SHARE PERF.      - -0.0095* 0.0036 -0.0462* -0.0112* 0.0188 -0.0214** 
  (0.0056) (0.0133) (0.0260) (0.0065) (0.0172) (0.0107) 
TERM +/- -0.0903** -0.0341* -0.1632** 0.0014 -0.0408** 0.0223 
  (0.0404) (0.0204) (0.0735) (0.0395) (0.0201) (0.0314) 
FIXED ASSETSi,t +/- -0.4864* -0.2585* -0.4297 -0.1434 -0.1875 -0.1632 
  (0.2599) (0.1445) (0.4492) (0.2151) (0.1739) (0.1708) 
Constant  1.0272*** 1.4491*** 0.8050 0.5705** 1.1611*** -0.1532 
  (0.2813) (0.1845) (0.6190) (0.2877) (0.2468) (0.2318) 
